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Airport Construction Project is Not Subject to the National En-
vironmental Policy Act Until Federal Funds Are Allocated. Boston
v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (lst Cir. 1972).
The Department of Transportation granted a tentative allocation
of federal funds to the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport)
for the development of an outer taxiway at Boston's Logan Air-
port. The construction threatened the surrounding area with in-
creased noise and also threatened to disrupt the city's long-planned
waterfront park.' Since no environmental impact statement had
been filed pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act,' the
I Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 256 (1st Cir. 1972). Boston is concerned
with Massport's construction plans in view of its threats of noise and future har-
bor filling disrupting the continued viability of the city's plans to rehabilitate an
adjacent area, Jeffries Point, where the city has long planned to construct a wa-
terfront park for the deteriorated community.
'National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, S 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C.
4332(2)(c) (1970) provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible: . . .
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between short-term uses of man's en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal
official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with re-
spect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such state-
ment and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State,
and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce
environmental standards, shall be made available to the President,
the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided
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city of Boston sought to enjoin the project,' which allegedly threat-
ened to irreparably damage the environment, contending that the
tentative allocation of funds raised federal question jurisdiction
under the NEPA.' The trial court denied the city's motion for a
preliminary injunction. Held, affirmed: An airport project is not
"federalized" until federal funds are allocated. Until then, a project
is not subject to the provisions, requirements or policies of the
NEPA. Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972).
Before a project is "federalized" there is no duty to file an en-
vironmental impact statement. Although the impact statement is a
precondition to the expenditure of federal funds, failure to file the
statement will not preclude state-funded construction because the
NEPA is not yet applicable. The First Circuit, noting that environ-
mental policies will be undermined if a state project is allowed to
damage the environment,' cautioned that when a state authority
expecting federal aid commences construction prior to final federal
approval, it proceeds at its own risk: "[T]he options of the federal
agency become increasingly limited to bald approval or rejection
with no opportunity for modification. ' Consequently, a state will
jeopardize its chances of obtaining future federal funds for a spe-
cific project if it is not sensitive to its environmental obligations.
Although the First Circuit would not enjoin construction pend-
ing the filing of an environmental impact statement, Massport was
warned that their requests for federal funds may be denied if the
environment is damaged by the pre-federally funded construction.'
by section 552 of Title 5 (United States Code) and shall accompany
the proposal through the existing agency review processes ...
A suit for temporary injunction is the common judicial relief used to require
federal agencies to fulfill the mandate of the NEPA and submit environmental
impact statements. See Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971) (property
acquisition for interstate highway enjoined pending preparation of NEPA Section
102 environmental impact statement); West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v.
Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971) (timber cutting and road
construction enjoined pending preparation of NEPA Section 102 statement); En-
vironmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng. of U.S. Army, 325 F. Supp.
749 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (Gilham Dam project enjoined pending preparation of
proper NEPA Section 102 statement); Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Rom-
ney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971) (highrise housing project enjoined for
failure to prepare NEPA Section 102 statement).
442 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).




In addition, the court indicated that "with minor exceptions, fed-
eral aid cannot be awarded for costs incurred prior to the execution
of the grant agreement."8 As a result, the longer Massport delays
filing the impact statement and continues construction, the less
federal funding it can expect to receive.
The city of Boston argued that the project became "federalized"
when a tentative allocation of federal funds was made and there-
fore construction must stop until a satisfactory environmental impact
statement has been issued The city urged that a tentative alloca-
tion of funds for an airport project is analagous to a tentative
allocation of federal funds for a highway project, and since a high-
way becomes subject to the NEPA prior to the expenditure of
federal funds," the same result should be reached when no federal
funds have been expended on an airport project. The First Circuit,
however, rejected this argument, reasoning that while federal-aid
highway planning is carried out in a "system" of discrete stages,
each requiring federal approval, the federal-aid scheme for airports
contemplates a single decision whether to fund the project.1 A
highway system, therefore, is "federalized" upon receiving "location
approval," even though this is prior to the actual allocation of
federal funds, because approval of the design, plans and construc-
tion will still be required."
The First Circuit reasoned that since only one decision is made
in the airport-aid situation, the decision to allocate must be deter-
minative of when an airport project becomes subject to the NEPA
requirement of an environmental impact statement. As a result,
I Id. at n.8.
9 Id. at 258. After the environmental impact statement has been issued, it must
be filed with the Council on Environmental Quality, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1970).
The Council on Environmental Quality has established guidelines for federal
agencies in compliance with the mandate of the NEPA. These guidelines require
an agency to assess its major action's potential environmental impact, establish
and explore alternatives that will minimize any adverse impact, and establish
methods for identifying actions requiring environmental impact statements; BNA
Environmental Rptr.-Federal Laws, 71:0301, at paragraphs 1, 2, and 3(a).
These guidelines have pervasive value in courts for determining the standards to
which an agency must adhere. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Un-
employment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 (1946).
'1 La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (a case with
a similar fact situation as the facts under consideration here; however, the in-
junction sought and granted concerned the continuation of a highway project).
"464 F.2d at 258-59.
"Id. at 259.
19731
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analogies drawn to the federal-aid highway practice were held
not controlling.
This distinction ignores the policy of the NEPA. The common
issue in both the highway-aid and airport-aid situations focuses
upon the enforcement of a procedural requirement of the NEPA-
the filing of an environmental impact statement. The federal statutes
cannot protect the environment as intended unless they are ap-
plied "prior to the time that the deleterious effects to the environ-
ment have taken place."' 3 The highway-aid cases have recognized:
the protections that Congress has sought to establish would be
futile gestures were a state able to ignore the spirit (and letter)
of the various acts and regulations until it actually receives funds. "
The First Circuit in Boston v. Volpe, citing La Raza Unida v.
Volpe" as a typical highway-aid case, implicitly rejected this argu-
ment by distinguishing highway cases as subject to earlier federal-
ization. The real significance of the highway decisions is the recog-
nition that the purpose of the environmental acts necessitates early
federal intervention. The federal district court in La Raza specifi-
cally rejected the contention that federal funding is the sole criteria
determining whether a highway project is subject to the NEPA,
not because a highway project is a "system" and therefore "fed-
eralized" when agency approval is first required as the First Circuit
held, but rather because if funding were the sole criteria, a state
could ignore the purpose of the act by damaging the environment
first and seeking federal-aid later.
In Boston v. Volpe the city sought to prevent environmental
destruction. The La Raza "result oriented approach" should be
applicable to all state projects whether highway or airport because
this approach furthers the congressional intent to protect the en-
vironment. The destructive effect on the environment during these
initial stages is often as great as for the completed project. Indeed,
the initial effects may be irreparable even without completion of
the project." If this approach is utilized, when a local government
requests federal funding it will assume a responsibility to protect
the environment; this responsibility should not be avoided merely
"aLa Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221, 231 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
141d.
15 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
"See note 1 supra.
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because state funds are being used prior to final federal-fund
allocation.
Massport's involvement with the federal agencies is clear; three
steps had occurred: (i) the airport, although fully empowered to
raise and spend funds, "requested" a federal grant;" (ii) the federal
agency made a "tentative allocation" of funds; 8 and (iii) the air-
port submitted a formal application for approval. 9 Since Massport
chose to involve itself with the federal agency early in the project's
construction rather than to sustain the financial burden involved
with the construction of an outer taxiway for Logan Airport with
purely state funds, the airport project was at a juncture and ripe
for the application of the environmental policy requirements.
This expression of environmental policy is supported by the
Fifth Circuit decision in Named Individual Members of the San
Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department,4' a
case footnoted but not expressly discussed in Boston v. Volpe.
The Fifth Circuit noted that a state is not forced to seek federal
funds or to accept federal participation in a highway project. A
state enters into a federal relationship with its "eyes open having
more than adequate warning of the controversial nature of the
project and of the applicable law."'" The court stressed the volun-
tary nature of the state's request for federal participation and con-
cluded that this involvement was sufficient to subject the project
to federal statutes even though federal participation had not ac-
tually commenced. The Fifth Circuit's reasoning de-emphasized the
"funding" issue, concluding that the state could not circumvent
the environmental laws by funding the highway project itself. Ac-
cordingly, the highway project was a federal project and was sub-
ject to the federal laws intended to preserve the environmental
quality; the state, as a partner in the project, could not subvert the
principle of federal supremacy by a mere change in bookkeeping
or by shifting funds from one project to another." The Fifth Circuit
did not base its decision upon a concept of "highway location ap-
17 14 C.F.R. $ 151.21(a).
18 14 C.F.R. § 151.21(b).
9 14 C.F.R. $ 151.21(c).
20446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
I' id. at 1028.
Id. at 1027.
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proval," which was the First Circuit's basis for distinguishing
highway cases in Boston v. Volpe, nor did the Fifth Circuit look
to actual fund allocation; rather the determination was based on
voluntary involvement with federal funding and participation. Since
the circuits conflict in determining when a project becomes "fed-
eralized" and subject to the federal environmental requirements, it
is appropriate to examine the congressional intent leading to the
adoption of these requirements.
When Congress enacted the NEPA, the primary objective was:
to build into the agency decision making process an appropriate
and careful consideration of the environmental aspects of proposed
action, and to assist agencies in implementing not only the letter,
but the spirit of the act. 3
The NEPA, as originally introduced" by Senator Jackson, did not
provide for the preparation of environmental statements. Although
the purpose of the Act was "to establish . . . a national policy to
guide Federal activities [that] are involved with, or related to the
management of the environment, or [that] have an impact on the
quality of the environment,"' the statute was not intended simply
to be permissive. It was designed to achieve results. After the
adequacy of a mere declaration of environmental policy that had
no "action-forcing mechanism"" was questioned in the Senate
23 BNA Environmental Rptr.-Federal Laws, 71:0301, para. 1 (1970).
24For the legislative history of S. 1075 see S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 8-11 (1969).
2-S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).
"6 Id. at 9 (emphasis added): A statement of national policy for the environ-
ment-like other major policy declarations-is in large measure concerned with
principle rather than detail; with an expression of broad national goals rather than
narrow and specific procedures for implementation. But, if goals and principles
are to be eflective, they must be capable of being applied in action. S. 1075 thus
incorporates certain "action-forcing" provisions and procedures which are designed
to assure that all Federal agencies plan and work toward meeting the challenge
of a better environment.
2' Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 before the Senate Interior and
Insular Affairs Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1969): "It seems to me that a
statement of policy by the Congress should at least consider measures to require
the Federal agencies, in submitting proposals, to contain within the proposals an
evaluation of the effect of these proposals on the state of the environment ...
It would not be enough, it seems to me, when we speak of policy, to think that
a mere statement of desirable outcomes would be sufficient to give us the founda-
tion that we need for a vigorous program of what I would call national defense
against environmental degradation. We need something that is firm, clear, and
operational."
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hearings,"8 Senator Jackson expressed misgivings about submitting
an act that did not go beyond "lofty declarations."2 The bill was
amended to impose specific requirements upon all federal agen-
cies."° Accordingly, the requirement that all agencies submit a
statement on the environmenal impact of proposed action was
added to assure compliance "to the fullest extent possible"'" with
the Act's directives and policies.
This requirement was also designed to insure that no agency
would utilize an excessively narrow construction of its existing
statutory authorization to avoid compliance.2
The District of Columbia Circuit Court emphasized this con-
gressional intent in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. United
States Atomic Energy Commission" when that court "laid down
the law" to federal agencies and swept aside a number of dilatory
tactics used by agencies to avoid implementation of the NEPA.
The court in Calvert Cliffs interpreted the NEPA literally to make
''environmental protection a part of the mandate of every federal
agency"" and established the rule that the NEPA is not to be
trifled with by federal agencies.'
An alternate theory for relief in Boston v. Volpe was based on
the Airport and Airway Development Act."' The AADA, which
modifies the NEPA and applies it to airport development projects,
mandates that airport projects "provide for the protection and
enhancement of the natural resources and quality of environment.""7
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 117: "You see, the problem we are faced with, if we try to go through
all the agencies that are now existing with certain responsibilities pursuant to law
in which there is not environmental policy or standard laid out, we could be en-
gaged in a recodification of the Federal statutes for a long, long time. But maybe
there is a way out of this through a directive and delegation to the Bureau of
the Budget of Authority which they could, in turn, exercise with prudence and
discretion in requiring that the environmental policies and standards be adhered
to in connection with the responsibilities of the Federal Establishment."
31U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 2770 (1969).
2 Id.
83449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
-'id. at 1112 (emphasis added).
Id.
36 49 U.S.C. §§ 1711--27 (1970).
37Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, § 16(c)(4), 49 U.S.C. S
1716(c)(4) (1970). Although § 1716(c)(1) of the AADA specifically states
1973]
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While all agencies are charged with the responsibility to imple-
ment the NEPA, the AADA charges the Secretary of Transporta-
tion with the specific duty to carry out the letter and the spirit of
the Act.
The "letter" is the procedural requirements of the AADA. The
Secretary of Transportation must consult with the Secretaries of
the Interior, Health, Education and Welfare, and Agriculture and,
after integrating his view with theirs,"8 reach a final decision con-
cerning the effects of a proposed airport project. If the Secretary
determines the project will have an adverse effect on the environ-
ment, he cannot grant approval unless he determines that no
feasible alternative exists and takes all possible steps to minimize
the adverse effects."9
The "spirit" of the AADA is the Congressional concern for the
environment. Although the NEPA is broad enough to include air-
port development, Congress felt that the urgency of the environ-
mental problem in the sensitive area of airport development neces-
sitated passage of the AADA. The explicit environmental policy
of the AADA combined with the more general policy of the NEPA
clearly demonstrates an intense concern of Congress and the na-
tion for the problems and responsibilities of environmental pro-
tection and conservation.
The holding in Boston v. Volpe that these Acts do not apply to
an airport development project until the federal funds are actually
received is contrary to this clear manifestation of Congressional
intent. Although the logic of the First Circuit is valid, the result
cannot be justified as a matter of policy. If the goal of environ-
that "all airport development projects are subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Transportation," courts interpret this phrase to refer only to federally funded
airport development projects. See New Windsor v. Ronan, 329 F. Supp. 1286
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Inglewood v. Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1971). No
interpretation has been issued by the courts construing when a project takes on
the characteristics of being "funded." Since the environmental policy is controlled
through funding, the city in Boston v. Volpe could have argued that a tentative
federal fund allocation, as a result of Massport submitting an application for
funds placed an airport project in the category of a federal project subject to the
environmental policy of the AADA, because it is just prior to the actual fund
allocation that the environmental policy can be most effectively enforced.
382 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3047, 3057 (1970).
"Id. at 3057-58. The same responsibility vested in the Secretary of Trans-
portation in the AADA is comparable to that contained in Section 4(f) of the
Department of Transportation Act of 1966.
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mental protection is to be realized, the NEPA and the AADA
must apply prior to the actual receipt of federal funds.
The First Circuit could have achieved this goal by granting
a temporary injunction halting construction until the environ-
mental impact statement was approved in compliance with the
procedures of the NEPA. Although the First Circuit recognized
that any negative environmental result of the construction would
eventually obstruct the airport's chances for federal funding, the
court failed to acknowledge that the negative environmental effects
might have irreversible consequences."0 Rather than the indirect
threat of loss of federal funding, the direct approach of requiring
compliance with the NEPA after federal participation by tentative
allocation of funds is more consistent with the clear mandate of
the Act. If an environmental policy is to become more than
rhetoric, agencies must be directed to participate in active and
objective-oriented environmental management before the environ-
ment is subjected to irreparable damage.'
Elliott Garsek
ENVIRONMENT-FEDERAL AGENCY ACTIONs-Federal Avia-
tion Agency Operations at a Completed Airport Are Not Governed
by the Procedures of the National Environmental Policy Act. Vir-
ginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E. D. Vir. 1972).
Citizens living near Washington National Airport brought a
class action for injunctive and declaratory relief against the Fed-
eral Aviation Agency seeking the elimination of all jet aircraft
operations from the airport because of alleged pollution from air-
craft emissions and increased aircraft noise. Plaintiffs urged that
the FAA's operation of the airport violated provisions of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act. Held: Complaint dismissed. The
40 See note 1 supra.
4 1 Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng. of U.S. Army, 348 F. Supp.
916, 927 at n.17 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
142 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970). It should be noted at this point that plain-
tiffs raised two other theories in their complaint that will not be directly discussed:
(i) The FAA actions are arbitrary, capricious, and constitute an abuse of discre-
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FAA's operation of Washington's National Airport is outside the
requirements of the NEPA. The airport had reached a stage of
completion making application of the Act to the ongoing operations
at Washington National no longer practicable.' Virginians for
Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Vir. 1972).
The district court in Virginians for Dulles has delineated an
exception to the National Environmental Policy Act. This excep-
tion is in contradistinction to the strong Congressional mandate in
the NEPA that all federal agencies act to preserve and protect the
natural environment. Thus, it is apparent that there is a conflict
between the Congress' policy of strict agency compliance and the
court's allowing exceptions to the Act's requirements.
I. THE NEPA, ITS PURPOSE AND MANDATE
The National Environmental Policy Act is an expression of
Congress' great concern for the national environment.' The pur-
pose of the Act is to ensure that all federal agencies consider values
of environmental preservation in their respective spheres of ac-
tivity.' Section 4332 of the NEPA prescribes certain procedural
measures that will ensure these values are respected. The Environ-
mental Policy Act, however, does more than compel federal
agencies to consider environmental factors in making decisions; it
provides a basis for challenging an agency's decision that may be
detrimental to the environment.'
tion. The court in Virginians refused to review the adequacy of the FAA pollu-
tion regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act because this review
would constitute an interference with the discretionary function of the FAA. The
court did not wish to disturb the agency's role as expert. See, Davis, Unreviewable
Administrative Actions, 15 F.R.D. 411 (1954); Patton v. Administrator of Civil
Aeronautics, 112 F. Supp. 817 (D.C. Alaska 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 217
F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1954). See generally, Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Com-
merce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); Ferris v. Wilbur, 27 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1928).
(ii) Plaintiffs also raised constitutional issues. These issues, however, are unre-
lated to the subject at hand.
2 Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573, 577 (E.D. Vir. 1972). The
court also found that introduction of the Boeing 727-200 "stretch" jet at Wash-
ington National was not a new "major federal action" requiring an environmental
impact statement under the NEPA.
342 U.S.C. §5 4321-4331 (1970).
4 ld. at § 4332.
'Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); National Helium Corp. v.
Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps
of Engineers, 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See Sive, Some Thoughts of an
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The Supreme Court, in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe,' stated that the standard by which a court may review an
agency's actions is provided by the law pertinent to that agency.
Congress has made the NEPA pertinent to "all agencies of the
[flederal [g]overnment"'; the standard applicable to the FAA is
provided in section 4332. This section demands that certain pro-
cedural functions be followed "to the fullest extent possible." Part
(2) (C) of section 4332 provides for the most important of these
procedures-the environmental impact statement. The impact state-
ment must be prepared whenever an agency undertakes a "major
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human en-
vironment." There must be included in the impact statement a
detailed analysis of the impact of the proposed action, the adverse
environmental effects of the project and alternatives to the project.
The data in the impact statement can then be used by a reviewing
court to determine whether the agency has acted arbitrarily vis-a-
vis the environment.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court, in Calvert Cliffs' Co-
ordinating Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Commis-
sion,8 offered a comprehensive analysis of the NEPA's effect on
agency procedures and projects. The issue in Calvert Cliffs' was
the application of the NEPA to the hearing procedures the Atomic
Energy Commission had promulgated to determine the environ-
mental feasibility of proposed installations. The court found the
intent of Congress to be that the Environmental Policy Act should
be strictly applied to agency actions:
Congress did not intend the Act to be a paper tiger. Indeed, the
requirement of environmental consideration to the fullest extent
possible sets a high standard for the agencies, a standard which
must be rigorously enforced by the reviewing court.'
Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 612 (1970); Note, Retroactive Application of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 69 MICH. L. REV. 732 (1971).
8401 U.S. 402 (1971).
742 U.S.C. 5 4332(2) (1970).
8449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
'id. at 1114. See Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Conserva-
tion Society of Southern Vermont v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761 (D. Vt. 1972); En-
vironmental Law Fund v. Volpe, 340 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.
1972); Morningside-Lenox Park Assoc. v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ga.
1973]
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Accordingly, the court compelled the AEC to adapt its hearing
process to the procedures of the NEPA.
This strict interpretation is supported by the Congressional his-
tory of the Act. The Congressional Conference Committee Report
on the National Environmental Policy Act stated:
[T]he language of Section [4332] is intended to assure that all
agencies of the Federal Government shall comply with the direc-
tives set out in the said section 'to the fullest extent possible' under
their statutory authorizations and that no agency shall utilize an
excessively narrow construction of its existing statutory authoriza-
tions to avoid compliance."
The Calvert Cliffs' decision, however, did not find that environ-
mental protection was the exclusive goal of Congress in enacting
the NEPA. Instead, the court determined that the Act requires a
reordering of priorities; environmental considerations are to be
elevated to an equal position with the primary concerns of the
agencies." For example, the Atomic Energy Commission is charged
with the rapid development of safe sources of atomic power. The
Environmental Policy Act will compel the AEC to consider the
environmental consequences of its actions in addition to the de-
velopment of atomic energy." The NEPA, therefore, forces the
agencies to engage in a balancing process considering both environ-
mental and non-environmental interests before decisions affecting
the environment are made. 3
When an agency finds that a proposed project may have an
adverse environmental impact, the project does not necessarily have
to be abandoned or altered. A majority of courts that have con-
sidered this issue, including the court in Calvert Cliffs', have inter-
preted the NEPA to require that agency action will have to be
1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728
(E.D. Ark. 1970); Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. United States,
(W.D. Tex.) 1 Envir. Rpts.-Cas. 1303, 1304 (1970).
11 Conf. Rep. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN.
NEWs 2767, 2770 (1969). For the opinion of the Council on Environmental
Quality, see 26 FED. REG. 7724 (April 23, 1971).
'i Calvert Cliffs' v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See 42
U.S.C. § 4335 (1970).
12 Calvert Cliffs' v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"
1Id. See Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323
(4th Cir. 1972); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
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altered only to the extent practicable under the circumstances."
The mandate of the Environmental Policy Act is not that environ-
mental concerns should be controlling, but that these concerns
should always be given full and fair consideration in the federal
agencies' decision-making process.
II. AN EXCEPTION TO THE NEPA
In Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, the district court found that
the Federal Aviation Administration's activities at Washington
National Airport were not within the ambit of the NEPA, and
therefore, the FAA is not required to consider the environmental
consequences of its actions. This conclusion is primarily based upon
dicta found in Arlington Coalition v. Volpe."
Arlington, a Fourth Circuit decision, concerned an "ongoing"
project, i.e., a project commenced prior to January 1, 1970, the
effective date of the NEPA. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin this "on-
going" highway project because the Department of Transportation
had not filed an environmental impact statement. Although the
Department of Transportation action was enjoined and compliance
with the Environmental Policy Act was required, the court out-
lined the limits of the Act's application to ongoing projects. Only
ongoing projects that can "practicably" be subjected to NEPA
requirements were deemed within the Act. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Fourth Circuit employed a "balancing of interests" test:
At some stage of progress, the costs of altering or abandoning the
project could so definitely outweigh whatever benefits that might
accrue therefrom that it might no longer be 'possible' to change the
project in accordance with Section [4332]."
In Virginians for Dulles, Washington National Airport was
found to be an ongoing federal project and that modification of its
operation would prove to be harmful.' In particular, the court
4 Arlington Coalition v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972); Environmen-
tal Law Fund v. Volpe, 340 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Elliot v. Volpe,
328 F. Supp. 831 (D. Mass. 1971); Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v.
Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970). Other courts have used a "feasible
and prudent" standard. See, e.g., Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp.
1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
"5 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972).
61 d. at 1331.
17 Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573, 577 (E.D. Vir. 1972).
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noted the economic importance of the airport to the city of Wash-
ington and the prominence of Washington National in the national
scheme of air commerce.18 The court reasoned that the economic
detriment arising from the alternation of an established airport
clearly outweighed any possible ecological benefit created by ap-
plication of the Environmental Policy Act.
The effect of Virginians for Dulles is a significant broadening of
the exception described in Arlington. Arlington dealt with a high-
way project-i.e., a project, which after its completion, would in-
volve little or no discretionary decision-making in its use. The
Federal Aviation Administration's operation of Washington Na-
tional Airport, on the other hand, involves discretionary decision-
making." The exception outlined in Virginians for Dulles excludes
from NEPA requirements a federal agency's activities at an instal-
lation completed or nearly completed prior to the effective date of
the Act. The manner in which an agency operates a federal airport,
dam or atomic energy plant significantly affects the quality of the
human environment; the time at which the project was "completed"
will not change this effect. Therefore, a project initiated prior to
January 1, 1970, should be within the Environmental Policy Act
if discretionary decision-making continues after that date."
Courts reviewing agency actions have found most ongoing fed-
eral projects to be "major federal actions" significantly affecting
the environment, and consequently, bound by the requirements of
the NEPA, particularly when the future exercise of discretion by
the agency was involved. For example, in Environmental Defense
Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority,2 the district court compelled
the TVA to apply Environmental Policy Act procedures to a dam
"Id. at 576.
"An excellent example of the discretionary decision-making of the FAA at
Washington National are the five anti-pollution regulations listed in Virginians
for Dulles, 344 F. Supp. at 575.
"See Note, 39 TENN. L. REV, 735 (1972).
" Arlington Coalition v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972); Lathan v.
Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Com. v. United
States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Indian Lookout
Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Conservation Society of
Southern Vermont v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761 (D. Vt. 1972); Environmental
Law Fund v. Volpe, 340 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Morningside Lenox
Park Assoc. v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
1339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
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project that was initiated in 1966. This project was implemented
in stages with a substantial amount of discretionary decision-
making occurring after January 1, 1970. Application of the NEPA
was held resonable because discretion was involved. The presence
of discretion was a strong indication to the court that the uncom-
pleted stages of the project could be altered if important ecological
considerations so dictated.
In Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett,3 the district
court refused to apply the NEPA to a highway project that was
complete except for a final inspection. The court's refusal to apply
the Act was based largely on the ground that no "discretionary
federal administrative action" was to take place after January 1,
1970. Since the project was virtually inalterable by the time the
NEPA went into effect, the court could find no reason to apply the
Act.2
4
The significance of these decisions is that discretionary agency
decision-making after January 1, 1970, is an important, and pos-
sibly a conclusive, factor to be considered by the courts in deter-
mining whether the Environmental Policy Act should apply to a
particular project. The presence of discretion indicates modification
of present agency procedures or plans is at least possible. This
factor should be given decisive weight by the courts.
III. CONCLUSION
The National Environmental Policy Act was designed to pre-
vent the agencies of the federal government from engaging in con-
duct detrimental to the environment. The mandate of the NEPA
is both strict and comprehensive: any federal action having a sig-
nificant effect on the environment must comply with the Act's
procedures.
The exception that the courts have placed upon the Congress'
mandate is valid. As observed in Arlington Coalition, some proj-
ects have reached a stage of completion that alternation for en-
vironmental or any other purpose would be impossible. In these
cases, filing an environmental impact statement would be both
wasteful and futile. The exception, however, should be limited to
23315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
24See Elliott v. Volpe, 328 F. Supp. 831 (D. Mass. 1971); Investment Syndi-
cates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Ore. 1970).
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situations when no discretion is left with the agency. Moreover, if
modification of either the project or of the procedures in operating
it is reasonable, the congressional mandate demands that the NEPA
apply.
The Federal Aviation Administration's operations at Washington
National Airport exhibit a high degree of discretionary decision-
making. The character of the anti-pollution regulations at the air-
port are a product of this discretionary decision-making process.
Alternation of these regulations is, therefore, possible. The court
in Virginians for Dulles should have followed the trend utilized in
other areas of "ongoing" federal projects and compelled the Fed-
eral Aviation Agency to file an environmental impact statement
on its regulations. Only if this is done can the public and the courts
reasonably judge the adequancy of the FAA's regulations.
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